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Abney: Sustainability, Morality and Future Rights

SUSTAINABILITY, MORALITY AND
FUTURE RIGHTS
Keith Abney
In moral theory, sustainability is understood as a meeting of environmental and inter
generational ethics-the intersection of responsibilities to the environment, our current
selves, and to future persons. There are four primary ethical approaches to sustainabil
ity: rights theory, Kantian deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. Only one-virtue
ethics-offers the promise of a coherent and fertile understanding of the complex issues
involved. To see why, the nature of rights and the nature of our duties towards the future
require explication. Neither nonsensically reified rights of future beings nor utilitarian
calculi accurately analyze such moral duties; instead, virtue ethics does so, by specifying
the necessary conditions for collectively and indefinitely sustainable human flourish
ing-with special attention to the ecosystems such flourishing requires.

1. Rights theory: problems of its use for sustainability
The concept of a moral person-one due moral consideration, a being capable of moral
ity-is often confused and conflated with genetic humanity, but a moment's reflection on
the status of corpses or possible extraterrestrials (Mr. Spock, say) shows such 'speciesist'
understandings cannot be correct. To clarify the concept of a moral person, we first need
to understand the nature of moral 'rights'-they are entitlements (being entitled to cer
tain considerations and/or freedoms), which in themselves place me under no obliga
tion. Rather, a right grants me a liberty-I may claim it, if I so choose; but I am under no
compunction to make the claim-it is up to me. So freedom or liberty is built into the
concept of 'a right'. My right to free speech does not require me to speak-it instead sim-
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ply means that I may speak, if I so choose-regardless of what others wish. (Of course,
that doesn't mean they have to listen!)
But rights claims I make do 10gicaJly entail responsibilities-not for me, but for other
persons. So, the correlativity thesis: any ascription of rights to oneself involves correla
tive obligations for others. If I am free to speak, then, at a minimum, you have an obli
gation not to shut me up. My'right' is hence a freedom to avoid being interfered with-it
constitutes a restriction on the ability of others to thwart my freedom. Such 'negative
rights' require merely autonomy for oneself and non-interference by others. Some rights
theorists also assert the existence of'positive rights, which impose even stronger obliga
tions upon others-they are required to assist me (if I so choose) in the exercise of my
right. (Federal 'equal time' laws for campaign advertising are understood as a positive
right-they require the assistance of the media to be exercised.) It follows that rights
claims logically require autonomy, the ability to be a law unto oneself, which requires
the capacity for the rational exercise of free will, or agency; and rights, as seen, also
require moral responsibilities, on each other person whenever I claim a right. So with
out autonomy, one cannot have rights; without rights to be free from some interference
in at least some parts of life, autonomy is impossible.
Of course, the correlativity thesis applies to all rights claims-not just my own. So if
anyone else has a right, I am under a correlative obligation; the only scenario under
which I have rights but no responsibilities is if no one else has rights at all-except me.
Likewise, in the absence of culpability-assignations of moral responsibility-claims of
rights are a mirage; I have no rights if others do not thereby have obligations to respect
those rights. In slogan form, 'No rights without responsibilities-per the correlativity
thesis, universal rights entail universal responsibilities/duties. There is a related slogan
form for compensatory justice: 'No right without a remedy'-a social right only exists
insofar as social means for compensatory justice exist. If my rights can be violated with
impunity, they do not really exist.
With all this in mind, the diagnosis of what ails rights discourse is enabled. In rights
theory, moral persons are all and only those capable of moral responsibility. Given the cor
relativity thesis, there are no rights without responsibilities; that is, every ascription of a
right to one involves correlative obligations for all other ... persons. Not everything has
obligations-lions, giraffes, tables and chairs have no obligations to respect my right to
free speech. That's because they are incapable of it-they cannot be morally responsible,
hence are simply not a person. Now, mind you, the converse of the cor'relativity thesis
does not hold-obligations can exist for persons without some person thereby being given a

right. You and I arrive simultaneously at a four-way traffic stop; we are both obligated
to stop, but neither of us has a 'right' to go first. Or-to address sustainability-we persons
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may well have duties to the environment or future generations, without those things
thereby having moral rights.
So the essential problem occurs because those who confuse morality with legalism or
due process often also confuse moral consideration with moral rights. The defenders of
animal rights, environmental rights, fetal rights, and so forth are trapped in moral dis
course that disguises their true concerns and legitimate claims because their theoretical
vocabulary embodies a deep incoherence. Simply put, animals, fetuses, and the envi
ronment have no rights. They cannot have rights, because they can neither exercise
agency, nor undertake obligations-they are not held responsible for what they do. And
as seen, rights claims logically require both autonomy (for the bearer of rights) and
autonomous responsibility (for all those who recognize a right). Non-human animals
(as far as we know) can neither rationally exercise free will nor bear responsibility for
infringing on the rights of others-hence they cannot be bearers of or respecters of
rights. Non-human animals can neither make rational claims nor be tried for their fail
ures to respect the claims of others. My cat or dog, whatever their other abilities, do not
have the capacity for autonomy or taking responsibility-and hence logically cannot have
rights. If animals such as dolphins or bonobos eventually do demonstrate such abilities,
then they would be considered rights bearers-and correlatively, citizens of the moral
community with obligations to us. In short, they would be persons. I have encountered
no convincing evidence of such abilities by them, so henceforth I assume they have no
rights. Occasionally legal fictions are created that ascribe rights to things without auton
omy-a recenl suit was filed on behalf of cetaceans against the US Navy, claiming that
whales and dolphins 'have a right' not to have noise pollution from submarines endan
ger their health. But of course, in reality the cetaceans were not making the claim-a
human was, in effect asserting his right to save the whales. (By the way, the case was dis
missed.)
Similarly, fetuses-and infants, for that matter-cannot have moral rights. They too
can neither exercise agency nor undertake obligations. And likewise for 'the environ
ment', or any other mistakenly reified rights holder. But of course, no one likely believes
that the fact that infants and pets have no rights means that morally we may do as we
like with them. That is, the moral community-the set of things to which moral consid
eration is due-is certainly larger than the set of rights holders-those who can rational
ly demand such consideration as a right, and hence as my obligation. And it is the
tendency to conflate 'having a moral right' with 'being due moral consideration' that has
poisoned intellectual discourse on these topics and created such ethical confusion. Stem
cells, pets, ecosystems, zygotes, fetuses, infants, and research animals all plausibly are
due varying degrees of moral consideration-but not because they have any rights.
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A Kantian holds that they are due consideration merely instrumentally, because
rights holders care about them-as is clear with the treatment of pets versus other ani
mals. Their value, says Kant, is merely instrumental: because some rational agents care
about Fluffy, it is wrong to harm Fluffy-but the harm is not directly to Fluffy, but indi
rectly to the agent, the holder of rights. Kant thought it wrong to torture dogs or cats,
not because of the harm to the dog-there is none-but because of the harm to the per
sons who care about the dog (and the harm to the torturer himself). Some seriously
believe that such an analysis can be extended to explain all moral consideration-that is,
non-rights holders are due moral consideration only insofar as rights holders care about
them-or insofar as they affect the interests of rights holders.
But I think it obvious that such an approach cannot succeed; it requires radical revi
sion and supplementation, as the discussion below will demonstrate. Its remnant plau
sibility rests on the fundamental confusion about who can and cannot have rights,
which both law and Kantian moral theory have continually obfuscated. This is especial
ly clear when discussing 'potential persons'-things that are not persons now, but (if all
goes well) can become persons at some later time. A fetus is obviously such a potential
person, but so are the later generations that sustainability theorists worry about-they do
not exist now, but could in the future. They have no rights-how could they? Just as cur
rent students are not graduates of Cal Poly, but are potential graduates-and so they have
no right to represent themselves (e.g., to employers) as graduates now. If all goes well,
they will have those rights at a later time-but they do not have them now. And so with
any other potentiality-future persons have no rights now. But that does not (pace Kant)
guarantee that we (current) persons have no obligations towards them.
The problematic nature of rights theory and Kantian ethics for sustainability revolves
around clarifying just such issues. Take Jane Doe, a hypothetical 25 year old, normally
functioning citizen ofthe year 2100. As a merely potential (future) person here in 2004,
she has no rights now-how could she? She does not even have the right to exist, we
assume; her hypothetical great-grandparents here and now do no wrong in choosing
not to have a child, in which case she never will exist. But in the year 2100, as an actual
person, she certainly will have rights-so she potentially, but not actually, has rights now.
What are my obligations, here in 2004, towards her-and her environment? Do I have a
responsibility to avoid global warming or asteroid strikes or nuclear fallout polluting
her environment or even making it un liveable? If so, we cannot say it is because she has
a right now that specifies my duty. Yet we do believe that causing e.g. massive pollution

or crop failure or intense radioactive fallout of future habitations or enormously
adversely affecting other aspects of sustainability is deeply wrong. We cannot specify
that wrongness in terms of current rights, or even in the interests or cares of current
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rights holders. A Kantian or rights approach simply will not work. How then do we
specify adequate and coherent moral thought about sustainability?
2. Sustainability, utilitarianism and intergenerational ethics
Given the failures of rights talk, a popular attempt to resolve our duties to the future is
to embrace some form of utilitarianism-the initially plausible idea that morality is
about producing the best possible consequences, understood as maximizing utility-the
net result of summing the good consequences of our actions and subtracting the bad.
Put baldly, ethics utilitarian-style is about the ends justifying the means; it simply claims
that what defines the moral is whatever produces the best possible future-an approach
superficially amenable to discussion of sustainability. Indeed, the issues of sustainabili
ty are often characterized in utilitarian terms; for instance, the concept of a 'Triple Bot
tom Line': in cost-benefit terms, the economic, environmental and social value our
activities add-and destroy.
In economics, 'sustainable growth' is standardly defined as the growth of real (infla
tion-adjusted) income that could be sustained indefinitely. On the other hand, environ
mental or ecological sustainability is oft opposed to economic: it is usuaUy driven by a
perception that the quality of the environment is negatively correlated with economic
development, and this cannot continue indefinitely, lest we all perish in the wastes of
our own affluence. Using some utilitarian calculus to attempt to escape this apparent
dilemma drives the analysis of sustainability in terms of the 'triple bottom line'. Broad
ly, this approach is supposed to capture the whole set of values, issues and processes that
society, especially business, must address in order to minimize any harm resulting from
their activities and to create and maximize the net result (or "profit") of the three 'bot
tom lines' of economic, social and environmental value. For business, this involves the
notion of responsibility being to the company's stakeholders-aU those affected by its
activities-including the shareholders, but also customers, employees, business partners,
governments, local communities and the public. Society depends on the economy-and
the economy depends on the global ecosystem, whose health is the acknowledged pre
requisite for the other two. This utilitarian version of the triple bottom line then simply
asks: how can we playoff competing costs of sustaining one versus the others, so as to
maximize 'net human preferences'? The pious hope has been that perhaps this cost-ben
efit utilitarianism, beloved of government, business, and social planners, can solve the
problem of our responsibilities towards Jane Doe and her environment.
Or perhaps not. A contemporary utilitarian with great influence on these issues is
Peter Singer, now of Princeton University. He rejects the economic form of utilitarian
ism advocated by some libertarians and other free marketers. That idea views utility as
equivalent to consumer net preferences, so the way to maximize utility is to maximize
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consumer preferences; an un trammelled free market in which everyone has the liberty
to buy or sell anything they own for any price mutually agreed upon hence maximizes
the economic preferences of the greatest number. This 'economic utilitarianism' hews

10

a libertarian line that recognizes property and the right to sell or buy it as the only pos
itive rights. The problems with this begin (but hardly end) with those who are devoid
of property but still need food, shelter, etc.-the poor.
To avoid this problem, Singer follows a 'radical economist' line of stating that there
are certain preferences which must be important for everyone, even if the individuals
involved might not think so-food and shelter highest among them. So we must find
food and shelter for the greatest number of people possible, and after that, other pref
erences in similar utilitarian fashion. Singer's view further claims that sentience (the
ability to experience pleasure/pain) is the key moral attribute, and all sentient creatures
should be treated in utilitarian fashion-more or less, we ought to maximize pleasure
and minimize pain for all sentient creatures. To a first approximation, morality thus
involves minimizing sentient suffering-suffering is only permissible when it produces
greater net pleasure in the long run. This view, alas for Singer, leads to reductio ad absur
dum.
Singer's utilitarianism implies that animal experimentation or consumption is
wrong except in a case in which we would be willing to experiment on or consume a
human with similar capabilities (sentience) to the animal. But, taken seriously, this view
undermines environmentalism (and indeed all ethics!) as usually understood. Our
human obligation then is to minimize total suffering, which means that 'wild animals'
are most certainly NOT to be left to their own devices, with nature red in tooth and claw.
No one disputes wild cats and dogs/wolves endure far more suffering than domesticat
ed ones, and so the human obligation to avoid suffering implies immediately that we
should domesticate as many species as possible. Further, a great deal of suffering occurs
in the context of hunting and killing associated with meat eating, so it makes sense that
we should not merely become vegetarians, but indeed should (as painlessly as possible!)
sterilize and even euthanize all predators and carnivores, so that we drive them to
extinction. Animal suffering would surely be alleviated in a world in which only peace
ful herbivores exist.
But in truth, for Singer we ought not stop there. The insects certainly behave as if
they register pain, and self-conscious mental states are unnecessary for suffering on
Singer's view ... so it appears crystal clear that the untold billions or even trillions of
numbers of insects, including termites and roaches, are far more morally considerable
than the entirety of the animal kingdom. A million roaches would certainly be more
valuable, in terms of sentience, than a human life. Indeed, a moral view would logically
bid all ecological niches occupied by animals be vacated as well, so that the far more
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numerous insects could occupy them without suffering. Even the predatory insects
should be extinguished, leaving only bees and their ilk. Hence, a world with only insect
and plant life would have far less suffering, and all animals hence should be (again, as
painlessly as possible!) driven to extinction. The culmination of ethical obligation is to
remove all creatures capable of it!

3. So utilitarianism is wrong - what then for sustainability?
For the treatment of humans Singer pretty well believes we have a duty to minimize the
suffering of others around the world, even at potential considerable cost to ourselves. Tn
particular, we have a responsibility to feed every starving person, as long as we have
more than enough food ourselves, etc. So for Singer, famine relief goes not nearly far
enough. Expropriation of wealth on a large scale from First to Third World is morally
mandated. In my view, Singer does not go nearly far enough in understanding that peo
ple's preferences need to be re-educated, nor does he fully acknowledge the horrible cor
ruption of advertising in this regard. In general, the role of education in changing both
preferences and the social and cultural as well as material basis for developing prefer
ences is obscured by such analyses, which reduce our responsibilities to a utilitarian cal
culation of how many starving people we can feed while still getting our jollies
elsewhere.
For an instructive contrast, in the late 1960s a philosopher named Garrett Hardin
publicized the so-called 'tragedy of the commons' as an illustration of a general prob
lem called the prisoner's dilemma, in which the action that is collectively rational for a
group does not map onto what is individually rational for each person involved.
Hardin's example was medieval English common land, which, with no private owner
ship, suffered from overgrazing, to the eventual ruin of all involved. This ruin occurred
because the benefits that each extra cow brings were reaped solely by its owner, but the
costs of the extra strain it put on the grass (and water, etc.) were shared among all the
users of what is held in common. In economic jargon, the costs were externalized-not
borne by the producers of the product, but by others. There is never an economic incen
tive to internalize external costs. So everyone selfishly had an incentive to raise as many
cattle as possible, although they knew if everyone did as they did, it would ruin every
one. But voluntarily refraining from use simply puts you at a competitive disadvantage
with someone who selfishly grazes more. So individually rational behavior deteriorates
into collective ruin. Solutions, claim Hardin, are privatization or more likely mutual
coercion, mutually agreed upon-as air, e.g., can't be privatized. So, Hardin believes that
the government must simply pass and enforce laws to coerce people to act in their own
long-term interest, even when some suffer as a result. In a sense, this amounts to a kind
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of longer-term utilitarianism, in which numerous humans are sacrificed at present to
save more later on-or to prevent many would-be miserable ones from ever being born.
Hardin generalized this approach for the sustainability of the whole biosphere, espe
cially as regards human overpopulation, in his "Lifeboat Ethics." He asserts that feeding
the starving when such practices are unsustainable is unjustified. In particular, if we feed
people and they reproduce and their children starve and we feed them... We cannot do
so forever, and sooner or later everyone will be starving-i.e., Malthus was right. As one
commentator put it,

It is moral to haul shipwrecked swimmers out of the water until one more
swimmer sinks the whole boat. The answer to how many swimmers we
can save is a scientific question. Thus, scientific morals.
Of course, it's not that simple. A better commentary follows rules drawn from
Hardin's work:
(1) An acceptable system of ethics is contingent on its ability to preserve

the ecosystems which sustain it.
(2) Biological necessity has a veto over the behavior which any set of
moral beliefs can allow or require.
(3) Biological success is a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition for
any acceptable ethical theory. In summary, no ethics can be grounded in
biological impossibility; no ethics can be incoherent in that it requires eth
ical behavior that ends all further ethical behavior. Clearly any ethics
which tries to do so is mistaken; it is wrong.
I believe that these last three laws are basically correct, with some caveats as to word
ing. But they don't validly generate the conclusion that we must allow millions of peo
ple to starve because at present we don't know how to create a sustainable economy for
their area. But of course, Singer's utilitarianism is misguided too-as seen, it flagrantly
violates the third law. Both Hardin and Singer fail sufficiently to appreciate how tech
nology and human cooperation can change the nature of the game. The 'demographic
transition' that occurs as literacy levels and other indicators move form a Third to First
World has always included a drop in birthrate, largely coincident with but lagging
behind (by 30-50 years) a drop in death rate. So populations boom for a while as health
care and food production get better and people live longer, then stabilize as birth rates
fall. I believe that the necessary conditions for such a transition are predicated on high
literacy and other education, the emancipation of women from solely traditional child
bearing roles into active social/work life, and expectations of reasonable health and
longevity for oneself and one's children. So I think the first focus of responsibility
around the world is to create such conditions everywhere. They are prerequisites for
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long-term sustainability and quality of life, and thus inculcating such virtues trumps
trying to save every single starving person.
We need a rich tapestry of the virtues that constitute the highest form of human life,
and to educate people into seeing their value, instead of simply allowing market forces
and advertising to pervert the values and preferences of the masses into short-term pris
oner's dilemmas. Virtue ethics, rather than utilitarianism, hence guides inquiry into
future obligations. It helps us realize that such values as conduce to human flourishing
are virtues, which will be self-authenticating-they will be the preferences people have

under conditions offree and informed inquiry, the values of a self-sustaining and self-cor
recting society. They will always have the truth as their overarching goal, not the maxi
mization of profit or any other lesser end.
Effecting this transition to an entire society which values the truth about everything,
from how much to consume to how much to read to how much to give to famine relief,
crucially depends on our ability to apply our education; that is, it depends on technol
ogy, and new technology changes what is 'sustainable'. And so it makes perfect sense,
e.g., to save as many lives as possible in a truly transitioning economy, because even if
their lives are unsustainable under conditions *at present*, *if* the transition continues,
their lives will become sustainable in the future. So it becomes a matter of priorities: to
a first approximation, we should save as many starving people as possible, *as long as*
they could also be given health care and educated to an awareness of the basics of free
inquiry, self-government and democratic rule with resources available.
And so J hold that our primary duty to any future Jane Doe is to assure that she will
be born into a society with those values. Because, in short, one can defeat prisoner's
dilemmas with education-one can get people to see what is selfishly rational is collec
tively irrational, and in the end, will bring them down too. Prisoner's dilemmas only
work when people don't understand the difference between collective and individual
(selfish) rationality-when they do not know how to reach a sustainable consensus, to
inculcate the virtues that lead to flourishing in lived society. Inculcating those values,
rather than any narrow short-term calculus of economic profit versus ecological costs,
or a misguided emphasis on the impossible ascription of "rights" to the environment,
will lead to the eventual solution to the problem of specifying our duties for sustain
ability. That is the real 'triple bottom line'. (;

Notes
All of the following are useful andlor used for the topics discussed:
L� Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons.
2.� Peter Singer, "Famine, affluence, and morality" and "A utilitarian defense of animal liberation", both found
in Pojman (ed.), Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application.
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